THE LEVANT NEWS — By Graham E. Fuller — What does Turkey need to do to overcome its present foreign policy fiasco, one of the worst in modern Turkish history?
The irony of all this is that those directly responsible for this mess—the team of Recep Tayip Erdogan (now president) and Ahmet Davutoglu, (former foreign minister and now prime minister)—is exactly the team that one decade had made extraordinary steps in creating a new, creative and successful foreign policy. What went wrong? And how can Ankara now climb back out of the deep hole that it has dug for itself?
The answer is simple: Erdogan and Davutoglu should return to their original successful principles of a decade ago, now recklessly abandoned.
The overwhelmingly most urgent task is for Ankara to get out of Syria.
Turkey’s Syrian policy has done more to destroy Turkey’s international position than any other single factor. But let’s be clear: Ankara is not primarily responsible for the present disaster in Syria. Syrian president Bashar al-Asad is. But Erdogan has hugely exacerbated the problem, encouraged radical jihadist elements fighting in Syria, helped stir up sectarian passions, and mishandled the Syrian Kurds. All these policies have damaged relations with countries that really matter for Turkey: Iran, Iraq, Russia, China, the US, the EU, Kurdish communities, and of course relations with Syria itself.
Instead Ankara has opened a dubious, dangerous, and futureless coalition with Saudi Arabia. And it has created a damaging confrontation with Russia in which Turkey is already the loser.
What should Ankara now do?
- Acknowledge the reality that Asad is not going to fall anytime soon—even though that was a reasonable assumption after the outbreak of an uprising against him in 2011. It must abandon the obsessive effort to overthrow him. Russia, the US, the EU, China, Egypt and even large numbers of Syrians now correctly believe that what might come after Asad is likely to be far worse than Asad. Turkey has little to gain and much to lose in continuing this fruitless struggle.
Work with the major powers to bring about a peaceful solution in Syria: working with the US, Russia and the EU, and rejecting Saudi Arabia’s absurd vision of a massive international Sunni army seizing control of Damascus.
Return to Ankara’s earlier policy of standing above sectarian struggle in the region. Turkey is predominantly Sunni, but it has large Shi’ite and Alevi (quasi-Shi’ite) populations. Turkey has not really sought to be the champion of Sunni Islam for several hundred years. Indeed, Turkey gained respect and clout when it sought to act impartially between Sunni and Shi’a groups a decade ago. It should play no favorites in that capacity now.
Work to improve its relations with Iran. Iran’s role in the region is growing steadily. It is vital to Turkey strategically and economically. It is a democracy in the making. Relations were seriously damaged when Turkey went all out to overthrow Asad, an ally of Tehran.
Work closely with Iraq to help overcome sectarian problems—not simply as a supporter of Sunnis in Iraq. Turkey does not benefit from a divided Iraq. Nor does Iran, which would prefer to exert its influence in a united and stable Iraq. Turkey is well equipped to help bring sectarian reconciliation about in Iraq, with its excellent economic relations with Baghdad and shared interests in the wellbeing of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Back away from strategic ties with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia rejects everything that Turkey claims to value: moderate Islam, religious and ethnic tolerance, non-sectarianism, non-intervention, democracy, globalizing markets, cultural attractiveness and soft power. Saudi Arabia, however, seeks only to draw Ankara in to be a Sunni champion and ally against Asad, against Iran, against the Iraqi Shi’ites and the Zaydi Shi’ites in Yemen.
Cooperate with the other Gulf States—as long as it is on a non-sectarian basis. Ties with Qatar in particular could be productive.
Place priority on restoring Turkish relations with Russia. Stop trying to drag NATO into unwise confrontations with Russia. The reality is that Moscow’s entry into the Syrian equation has all but eliminated Ankara’s options and freedom of action there. And Ankara cannot defeat Russia diplomatically. Furthermore, like it or not Moscow is in fact well-positioned to forge a political settlement in Syria.
If Turkey undertakes the six policy shifts outlined above, its relations with Moscow will automatically improve.
- Devote priority to close relations with all Kurdish elements in the region. Turkey, through the wisdom of its earlier policies, had won over the Iraqi Kurds as a close ally. But Erdogan has allowed his earlier path-breaking rapprochement with the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey, the PKK, to collapse. Ankara has refused to deal with the Syrian Kurdish movement, one of the few effective fighting groups against ISIS in Syria. It may be sliding into a general war against the Kurds which it might be able win on the battlefield but will assuredly lose politically.
Growing Kurdish power in the entire region is a reality—it has been on an upward curve for the last 25 years, invariably benefitting from each regional conflict to achieve greater de facto autonomy and world awareness. If Ankara is determined to stop Kurdish progress towards greater autonomy—anywhere in the region—it will only alienate the Kurds; above all such a posture will only hasten the emergence of greater Kurdish political, economic and cultural demands. Efforts to block this process of Kurdish emergence will not only fail, but will guarantee an uglier and more dangerous relationship for Turkey and the entire regional Kurdish reality long into the future.
Ironically, handled right and granted broader autonomy, most Kurds will inevitably look to Turkey as a regional protector, economic entrepôt and cultural magnet—as long as Ankara does not alienate them. Where else could the Kurds look for valuable geopolitical ties in the region?
Ankara deserves great credit for having moved generously and humanely to accommodate more than two and a half million Syrian refugees inside Turkey. When Syrian domestic violence finally begins to end, many Syrians will go back home, but not all. This could be a problem for Turkey, but also a benefit. The Ottoman tradition included an important role for Arabs within imperial rule. Today Turkey can only be enriched and strengthened through the acquisition of new Turkish Syrian citizens who can facilitate Turkish entree into the Arab world. Turkey is, after all, multinational already, with huge numbers of other ethnic groups, from the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. A stronger Arab voice and expertise will only add to Turkey’s regional clout, economic access, and skills.
Finally Turkey should cooperate with Washington where it can, but only to the extent that Washington’s own policies in the region are wise and productive. Since 9/11 (and arguably even much before) US policies in the Middle East have been disastrously bad, failing and destructive. Ankara would not cooperate. President Obama in recent times, however, has dialled back the level of US intervention and aggressiveness, especially now in Syria. If Ankara can undertake all these policy shifts its relations with Washington will much improve. That is assuming the next American president approaches the Middle East with wisdom — for which there is little guarantee.
All this also assumes that Erdogan will act wisely and not sacrifice Turkey’s foreign policy interests to his own reckless and divisive drive for greater personal power. Erdogan’s personal interests are not synonymous with the Turkish national interest.
Erdogan had once embraced and implemented Ataturk’s wise adage: Peace at home and peace abroad. Now he has abandoned those principles and is left with neither.
Graham E. Fuller is a former senior CIA official, author of numerous books on the Muslim World; his latest book is “Breaking Faith: A novel of espionage and an American’s crisis of conscience in Pakistan.” (Amazon, Kindle)